



# Sanctions and the Future of Russian Oil and Gas

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
### Sanctions on Russian oil and gas companies

	US Treasury EO 13662 Directive 2 (Financing)	US Treasury EO 13662 Directive 4 (Technology)	US Commerce Dept. Export Controls	EU Finance Restrictions	EU Technology Restirctions
Transneft	Yes	(1006//		Yes	Yes
Gazprom		Yes	Yes		
GazpromNeft	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
LUKOIL		Yes	Yes		
Novatek	Yes				
Rosneft	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Surgutneftegaz		Yes	Yes		

- US and EU sanctions ban transfer of technology for use in Arctic, deep water offshore (>500 feet) and for shale oil development
- Financial restrictions on access to capital markets 90 day debt maturity in US, 30 days in EU
- Rosneft and GazpromNeft the main overlap. No financial restrictions on Gazprom, Novatek hit hard by inclusion on US list
- Russian banks also targeted with 30 day debt maturity rule in both areas
- Importantly Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway have also introduced sanctions



Future of Russian oil production – key drivers




Source: Ministry of Energy, General Scheme of Development of Oil industry to 2020, EIA International Energy Outlook 2013

- Maintaining oil production above 10mmbpd is becoming a key challenge
- Slow growth from current levels (10.6mmbpd) had been expected
- This now seems unlikely as new fields are postponed
- Long-term challenge to enhance existing fields and develop new regions using advanced technology and international experience




### Russian GDP, oil production and the oil price

#### Oil price and Russian oil output




Tight correlation
between oil price,
economic growth and oil
production

#### Oil price and Russian Real GDP



Russian stocks and energy prices: moving in lockstep







### Development of Russian Arctic now in serious doubt

Russia has largest share of Arctic resources

Partnership with Exxon has been key focus






- Arctic development a prestige political project for Russia as well as a longterm production solution
- Opportunity to develop world-leading technology in partnership with IOCs and establish important presence in emerging new region
- Rosneft will not be able to move forward with plans without IOC support, both financial and technical

## Tight oil in Russia will be delayed despite continued enthusiasm

Bazhenov shale extensive in West Siberia



Production potential up to 1.5mmbpd




Source: Rosnedra, RF MoE

- Russia has the largest shale oil resources in the world
- Bazhenov shale has been know about for years, but foreign partnership needed to exploit it successfully
- Shell, Exxon, Statoil, Total and BP have all formed JVs, now on hold
- Russian service companies cannot offer adequate equipment



# Brownfield recovery through EOR is still possible, but western service companies are needed

#### Russia's oil is getting more difficult




Source: E&Y

- Difficult to recover reserves account for 62% of Russian total
- IEA estimates that EOR could account for 500kbpd of output by 2030
- Tertiary methods gradually being introduced as tax incentives increase
- International techniques brought by IOCs and service companies
  - 95% of horizontal wells drilled by international service companies
- Confusion over exact impact of sanctions here
  - Clarity still being sought concerning equipment with dual uses




### Rosneft faces testing financial issues




- Rosneft has \$66 billion of outstanding debt, of which half needs to be repaid inside two years
- Ministry of Economic Development believes that access to capital markets could occur in 2016/17 at the earliest
- Rosneft has applied to National Wealth Fund for more than 2 trillion RUR (c. \$44bn)
- Company is already being forced to re-prioritise projects and seek new partners

## Previous gas market developments – rise of Novatek and Rosneft

Gazprom output in long term decline...




...due in part to increasing domestic competition




- Gazprom has struggled over the past decade, with output hitting a post-Soviet low in 2014
- Increasing competition in all the company's core markets has combined with the economic crisis, US shale gas, low coal prices and increased support for renewables to undermine sales
- Independent producers in Russia have also been producing more, leaving Gazprom with a significant supply bubble
- Outlook in Europe and FSU markets related to politics as well as economic

# Gazprom faces an uncertain future in Europe – but continued significant gas sales seem inevitable




#### Russia offers the cheapest gas supply



- Ukraine situation creates a clear security of supply risk for Europe this winter
- In the long-term, does the risk concern Russian supply or Ukraine transit?
- The EU appears split over the desirable place for Russian gas as a source of imports – the South Stream debate has highlighted the dilemma
- Russia's competitive commercial position is very strong it has excess gas at a low cost of supply


### Russia has called Europe's bluff and re-focussed on




- South Stream project cancelled as EU not supportive
- Alternative pipeline to Turkey proposed
- Ukraine transit risk left with EU; Russia targets Europe's only growing gas market, but is this the optimal route?

### Russia wants to balance exports between Europe and Asia

Crude oil export strategy




Possible outlook for gas exports



- Expansion into Asia has always been a sensible strategy for Russia, with action catalysed by the current political situation
- China offers a huge growth market, but also a dependency risk
- China has been ambiguous in its support of Russia in 2014, and its gas consumption plans remain unclear
- Despite the bold talk, the Russian shift East offers little real threat to Europe, as all parties need a balanced supply and demand picture

The switch to Asia triggered a move to LNG, but this has now reverted to a pipeline export strategy




- LNG expansion posed a threat to Gazprom via Novatek and Rosneft
- Projects now delayed or postponed due to lack of finance, customer commitment and certainty over technology
- Pipeline strategy suits Gazprom and Russian budget
- Possibility of new lines to Korea and Japan could extend political reach




# Russian gas is competitive in Asia, and volumes could grow rapidly by 2030

Possible scenario for Russian gas in Asia

Cost of supply of alternative gas to Shanghai






- Yamal LNG is likely to proceed, but behind schedule, with expansion of Sakhalin 2 another possibility
- Three pipelines to China are feasible over time, with two already under discussion / agreement
- Russian gas can be competitive in China / NE Asia, albeit at very modest returns for Gazprom



# Consolidation of state control in the oil and gas sector is an ever increasing theme


- Rosneft and Igor Sechin remain very influential, especially in the oil sector
- Bashneft example demonstrates that loyalty to the current administration is paramount
- Competition between domestic companies is being discouraged; reform is not on the agenda
- Rosneft and Gazprom remain at war, but have bee constrained by sanctions and Russian "fortress" mentality
- Budget revenues under threat from lower oil price, meaning that pipeline gas exports need to become more important over time

#### State control of Russian oil production





#### Russia sits at the heart of the global energy economy – there is growing competition but it has plentiful relatively low cost resources



Gas export / import province name

Gas import province

- Will politics undermine commercial advantages?
- Will lack of finance cause a lack of investment?
- Can Russia move forward without IOC support?

