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Nuclear Energy

Lessons from the Nuclear Waste Negotiator Era of the 1990s for Today’s Consent-Based Siting Efforts

Reports by Matt Bowen • September 11, 2024

This report represents the research and views of the author. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Center on Global Energy Policy. The piece may be subject to further revision. Contributions to SIPA for the benefit of CGEP are general use gifts, which gives the Center discretion in how it allocates these funds. Rare cases of sponsored projects are clearly indicated.

For a full list of financial supporters of the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University SIPA, please visit our website at Our Partners. See below a list of members that are currently in CGEP’s Visionary Annual Circle. This list is updated periodically.

CGEP’s Visionary Annual Circle

Corporate Partnerships
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
Tellurian Inc.

Foundations and Individual Donors
Anonymous
Anonymous
the bedari collective
Jay Bernstein
Breakthrough Energy LLC
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF)
Arjun Murti
Ray Rothrock
Kimberly and Scott Sheffield

Executive Summary

Nuclear power is being weighed in energy transition plans around the world, as countries seek to replace fossil fuels with low-carbon alternatives while also meeting growing energy demand and maintaining reliability and affordability. When considering extension of existing nuclear reactor licenses as well as approving new ones, there is an ethical obligation for today’s users to develop plans for long-term management of the resulting nuclear waste and not defer its disposition to future generations. In the United States, the federal government is contractually obligated to take ownership of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) produced at power plants, but this has not happened. The one deep geologic repository project named in law by Congress for potential disposal of SNF—Yucca Mountain in Nevada—has reached a stalemate, with Congress appropriating no money to move the project forward since 2010 due to Nevada’s opposition.

Negotiations with US states and tribes to host storage and disposal facilities have been sensitive in the past due to both a stigma around nuclear waste and a perception of risk associated with such facilities. A federal “nuclear waste negotiator” role existed in the early 1990s to overcome these difficulties and find a state or tribe willing to host a repository or interim storage facility, though this short-lived, volunteer-based program did not lead to deployment of either.

This report, part of a series of publications on nuclear waste policy at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University SIPA, reveals lessons learned from the experiences of the two prior negotiators that could benefit a recent, congressionally directed effort at the Department of Energy (DOE) to begin a “consent-based” siting program for nuclear waste. Those individuals were authorized to negotiate terms and conditions—including financial and institutional arrangements—with a state or tribe in a written agreement that would then have to be approved by Congress. Importantly, a state or tribe was assured it could explore the potential of hosting a site while retaining the right to withdraw at any time, and if it did proceed, would have a measure of power in setting terms for the project. 

Additional insights from the prior nuclear waste negotiator role for similar efforts today include the following:

  • Title IV of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), in which the negotiator role was outlined, included high-level consent requirements—a written agreement between the federal government and a host state or tribe, followed by congressional approval—that have been present in other successful nuclear waste management facility projects, such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. Such consent requirements would enshrine a role for the state in the event that, for example, a county within it wanted to move forward with studying a nuclear waste management facility.
  • Congress could consider two options for utilizing the negotiator provisions of the NWPA: 1. reinstating the expired negotiator office and providing funding for it, or 2. directing the secretary of energy to follow the approach laid out in Title IV. A separate negotiator office would be independent of DOE and thus could approach negotiations without the historical baggage of the agency. The secretary of energy, on the other hand, has a higher profile than a separate office would and has a clear ability to negotiate provisions of interest to states and tribes beyond those only related to nuclear waste.
  • Two tacks taken by the negotiators in the 1990s to stimulate state and tribal engagement in potentially hosting a facility could be employed under a new negotiator: 1. openly soliciting any interested states, local governments, and tribes to participate in multiple phases of increasingly detailed studies, and 2. proactively approaching communities that the federal government has reason to believe may be qualified and interested (e.g., those with military bases that are closing or DOE-owned facilities and laboratories).
  • Defining the potential benefits of hosting a facility—such as infrastructure improvements or economic development through job creation at the facility site as well as potentially co-locating other federal projects or supply chain industries within the state—at the beginning of public discussion would help communities weigh such potential upside against any perceived risks.
  • The limited time afforded to each negotiator, one for a little over two years (before a new administration was elected) and one for 15 months, hampered their ability to reach an agreement with states and tribes. If the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator were to be reconstituted, providing a longer term and ensuring continuity across administrations would add credibility to the position and could raise the likelihood of success.
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Nuclear Energy

Lessons from the Nuclear Waste Negotiator Era of the 1990s for Today’s Consent-Based Siting Efforts

Reports by Matt Bowen • September 11, 2024