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Commentary by Richard Nephew • February 15, 2019
On 13 February 2019, Senators Menendez, Graham, Gardner, Cardin and Shaheen introduced the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act (DASKA) of 2019. Their draft bill, which is still going through the administrative process for formal publication, would do much to intensify U.S. sanctions against Russia. As anticipated in November 2018, the 2019 version of DASKA looks much like the 2018 version, in that it prioritizes energy, finance, and targeting of Russian oligarchs. However, there have been some important changes that ratchet up the pressure on the energy sector that are worthy of greater attention.
This short note describes key elements of the bill, offers a brief assessment of their implications and provides a forecast of the process that may be involved in bringing the legislation from its present draft to enacted law.
Stretching over 100 pages, DASKA 2019 is a formidable piece of legislation, encompassing several sections and elements of the current U.S.-Russia relationship. Five points are worth highlighting, however.
Importantly, though the first two listed items above would involve sanctions similar to those contained in the Iran Sanctions Act, the latter three would be implemented via the addition of those entities and individuals to the U.S. Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list. This could create a real risk of secondary sanctions application, with banks and companies around the world affected just as with the Deripaska sanctions of April 2018.
Russian sovereign debt is also targeted for sanctions, but this would only affect U.S. persons and new debt, which might reduce some of the immediate impact and diplomatic sensitivity.
It is too early to project fully the effects of these sanctions, not least because it is certain that the bill will change as stakeholders read and reflect upon it. Two points leap out, however:
As with any introduced legislation, DASKA 2019 now needs to go through the Senate process for review and evaluation. This could be, in theory, extensive, especially if senior Republicans do not wish to bring it forward.
However, with Democrats now in charge of the House of Representatives, there is a reasonable chance that they will either introduce their own companion legislation soon or simply take DASKA 2019 as it stands through their own process. If so, given Democratic majorities, it is reasonable to argue that this legislation could pass through the House very quickly and with minimal debate. House contacts, however, note a real desire to run a normal process on legislation of this magnitude, so this may delay action.
Regardless, it seems reasonable to argue that the House could pass Russia sanctions legislation of some form or another by the end of March. Pressure on the Senate would then mount to push this legislation forward, especially given frustration among some Republicans with that January EN+ relief vote and the presence of two Republican senators as original sponsors of the bill. For all of these reasons, it is possible that Russia sanctions – very likely involving amended versions of the provisions identified here – could be put to a vote in the Senate before the beginning of the August recess and put before the President shortly thereafter.
Richard Nephew joined the Center on Global Energy Policy in February 2015 directly from his role as Principal Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the Department of State, a position he held since February 2013. Nephew also served as the lead sanctions expert for the U.S. team negotiating with Iran. From May 2011 to January 2013 Nephew served as the Director for Iran on the National Security Sta where he was responsible for managing a period of intense expansion of U.S. sanctions on Iran.
The views in this commentary represent those of the author.
This work was made possible by support from the Center on Global Energy Policy. More information is available at http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/about/mission.
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Commentary by Richard Nephew • February 15, 2019